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WALK THIS WAY:  DO PUBLIC SIDEWALKS 
QUALIFY AS SERVICES, PROGRAMS, OR 
ACTIVITIES UNDER TITLE II OF THE 




In 2005, 54.4 million people in the United States reported some degree of 
disability.  For many of these people—particularly the 13.5 million 
Americans who use wheelchairs, canes, crutches, or walkers—the issue of 
sidewalk accessibility is not merely one of convenience, but of civil rights 
and public safety.  Faced with public sidewalks that are impassable due to 
disrepair, physical obstacles, or an absence of curb ramps, many 
individuals with disabilities are forced to choose between remaining 
housebound or traveling in the streets—posing a danger to both themselves 
and drivers.  However, as disability activists push to resolve these 
shortcomings with an eye toward enhancing accessibility, cities counter by 
pointing to the significant expense of upgrading thousands of miles of 
sidewalk.   
How to remedy the deterioration of public sidewalks has become a topic 
of debate between disability advocates and cities grappling with severe 
budget constraints.  Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits 
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”  This Note examines the circuit split 
among federal courts as to whether public sidewalks are “services, 
programs, or activities” within the meaning of Title II, thus providing 
plaintiffs with a private right of action to force cities to ensure that public 
sidewalks are accessible to the disabled.  This Note argues that the 
statutory text, legislative history, implementing regulations, and agency 
interpretation of Title II of the ADA supports the conclusion that “services, 
programs, or activities” includes public sidewalks. 
    
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law.  Many thanks to Professor 
Martha Rayner for her supervision, and my friends and family for their encouragement.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In November 2004, Elizabeth “Lisi” Bansen died when an SUV hit her as 
she traveled in her wheelchair from the corner store to her home.1  Bansen 
was relegated to the street because the sidewalk was not wheelchair 
accessible.2  The sidewalk near Bansen’s home was cracked and “choked 
with weeds,” and there was no curb ramp at the intersection where she was 
killed.3  In 2007, a jury found the city of St. Louis liable for Bansen’s death 
due to the city’s “failure to maintain safe and usable sidewalks.”4  Although 
the city had already spent $7.5 million to install curb ramps at ninety 
percent of the city’s intersections, some areas of the city had simply 
“fall[en] through the cracks.”5
Lisi Bansen’s story is not unique.  In 2006, Josefina Quinones sued the 
city of Chula Vista for $10 million after her husband, James A. Quinones, 
was struck and killed by a car.
 
6  James, who used an electric wheelchair, 
was traveling in the street because there was no ramp to get onto the 
sidewalk.7  In 1998, Ohio resident Kelly Dillery was charged with child 
endangerment after a motorist complained about Dillery riding her 
wheelchair in the street with her four-year-old daughter in her lap.8  Dillery 
argued that the sidewalks were inaccessible and eventually sued the city of 
Sandusky under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).9
As these stories indicate, the accessibility of sidewalks and curbs has 
become an issue of public safety for many.
 
10  Of the 291.1 million people in 
the United Sates in 2005, 54.4 million reported some degree of disability.11
 
 1. See Jeremy Kohler, Path of Resistance, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 11, 2005, at 
A1; see also Elizabeth Pendo, Taking It to the Streets:  A Public Right-of-Way Project for 
Disability Law, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 901, 904–05 (2010) (discussing the Lisi Bansen story). 
  
 2. See Kohler, supra note 1, at A1. 
 3. See id.; see also Pendo, supra note 1, at 904. 
 4. Pendo, supra note 1, at 904–05. 
 5. Kohler, supra note 1, at A1. 
 6. See Tanya Mannes, Widow:  Lack of Ramps Led to Husband’s Death, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., June 15, 2007, at B1. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See Wheelchair Mom Not Guilty of Putting Daughter, 5, at Risk, PLAIN DEALER 
(Clev.), Mar. 12, 1999, at 1A; Disabled Mother Innocent in Ohio, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 12, 
1999, at A24. 
 9. See Mom in Wheelchair Files Suit in Sandusky, PLAIN DEALER (Clev.), June 12, 
1999, at 4B; see also RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 586 (7th ed. 
2009) (noting that Dillery’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act also included 
allegations that “police ‘stopped, charged and harassed’ her because of her disability” and 
“made no reasonable accommodation for her” (quoting Kelly Dillery’s police report)). 
 10. See, e.g., Donald Shoup, Putting Cities Back on Their Feet, 136 J. URB. PLAN. & 
DEV. 225, 225 (2010) (commenting that broken sidewalks “especially impede people with 
disabilities”); Chris Joyner, Sidewalks Become Battlegrounds, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2009, at 
3A (discussing the “potentially dangerous practice” of disabled individuals across the 
country using their wheelchairs to travel in the streets due to sidewalk disrepair). 
 11. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POP. REP. P70-117, 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:  2005, at 4 (2008), available at 
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In addition to the 13.5 million Americans who use wheelchairs, canes, 
crutches, or walkers, 7.8 million people reported some level of visual 
impairment, including 1.8 million who are completely blind.12
However, as disability rights advocates push for cities to comply with the 
standards of the ADA,
 
13 cities note that the classification of sidewalks as 
“services” has significant fiscal consequences.14  Under Title II of the 
ADA, public entities are obligated to bring their “services, programs, and 
activities” into compliance with ADA regulations regarding accessibility.15  
Cities argue that designating sidewalks as “services” ignores the financial 
limitations on public entities given the “phenomenal[] expens[e]” of 
bringing thousands of miles of sidewalk into compliance with the ADA.16  
How to best handle the deterioration of our nation’s sidewalks has become 
a point of contention between disability rights advocates and municipalities 
facing severe budget constraints.17
Title II of the ADA forbids disability discrimination by government 
entities by providing that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
 
18  While the statute defines 
both “public entity” and “disability,” Title II does not explicitly define what 
constitutes a “service, program, or activity.”19
 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p70-117.pdf (based on data collected from a Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) conducted in 2005).  The SIPP concerned only 
the civilian non-institutionalized population of the United States, and consequently did not 
include the disability statuses of individuals living in institutional group facilities, such as 
nursing homes. Id. at 3–4.  Statistician Matthew Brault notes that had institutionalized 
persons been included in the population universe, “estimates of disability prevalence may 
have been higher.” Id. at 3. 
  This Note examines the 
extent to which plaintiffs have a private right of action under Title II to 
force a city to maintain public curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots in 
compliance with the ADA.  Specifically, this Note addresses whether public 
 12. See Pendo, supra note 1, at 904 (citing BRAULT, supra note 11, at 6). 
 13. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). 
 14. See Stephanie Francis Cahill, Where the Sidewalk Ends:  Court Rules Sidewalks 
Must Be Accessible Under the ADA, A.B.A. J. E-REP. (A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), June 28, 2002, 
at 9 (discussing the position of the National League of Cities, that “financial straits prohibit” 
cities from making sidewalks completely accessible, and that the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision recognizing sidewalks as “services” under Title II “ignores the 
limitations on public entities” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Joyner, supra note 10, 
at 3A (reporting that “cash-strapped cities and disability-rights advocates [are] at odds” over 
how to deal with the problem of inaccessible sidewalks). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12134 (2006); see 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (2010 and Mar. 15, 2011 
amendments). 
 16. Cahill, supra note 14, at 9. 
 17. See id.; see also Joyner, supra note 10, at 3A. 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
 19. Id. § 12131; see Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 476, 485 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g 
en banc granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011); Barden v. 
City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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sidewalks can be considered “services, programs, or activities” within the 
meaning of Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.20
Part I of this Note explains the civil rights model of disability law, 
discusses the provisions and court interpretations of section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA, and, finally, addresses the tools 
of statutory interpretation.  Part II details the recent circuit split among the 
federal courts regarding whether public sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots 
qualify as “services, programs, or activities” under Title II of the ADA.  At 
stake in this conflict of statutory interpretation is whether an individual may 
bring a private action against a public entity when public sidewalks do not 
meet the accessibility requirements of the ADA regulations.  Finally, Part 
III argues that though sidewalks themselves may be “facilities,” the 
provision and maintenance of a public sidewalk system is a government 
service within the meaning of Title II. 
 
I.  DISABILITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS:  NONDISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC 
SERVICES UNDER SECTION 504 AND TITLE II OF THE ADA 
A.  The Shift from the Integrationist Model of Disability to the Civil Rights 
Model 
Disability law, and the relationship between disability and the law, has 
changed as society’s understanding of disability has developed over time.21  
In the 1960s, disability rights activist Jacobus tenBroek detailed a shift in 
the disability law paradigm from “custodialism” to “integrationism.”22  
Professor tenBroek maintained that laws relating to the handicapped 
originally developed on a theory of custodialism—a medically oriented 
model of disability that emphasized the physical differences of persons with 
disabilities and the need to cure, or separate and protect, these individuals.23
Professor tenBroek contrasted the custodial model with the newer 





20.  Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 701–795n (2006)). 
  Proponents of the integrative model disregarded isolation and 
protection, instead focusing on achieving equality, access, and full 
 21. See MARK C. WEBER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY LAW 1 (2007); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 101-485(III), at 25–27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 447–49. 
 22. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 
CALIF. L. REV. 809, 816 (1966); see WEBER, supra note 21, at 1.  
 23. tenBroek & Matson, supra note 22, at  815–16; see WEBER, supra note 21, at 1.  
Custodialism is a “societal approach[] to disability” that reflects itself in “‘policies of 
segregation and shelter, of special treatment and separate institutions.’” Robert L. Burgdorf, 
Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond:  Disability in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 
241, 247–48 (2008) (quoting tenBroek & Matson, supra note 22, at 816). 
 24. See tenBroek & Matson, supra note 22, at 816; see also Burgdorf, supra note 23, at 
265 (explaining that the civil rights model of disability “views the limitations that arise from 
disabilities as largely the result of prejudice and discrimination” rather than simply the 
“inevitable result” of an individual’s physical or mental impairments). 
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participation in society for individuals with disabilities.25  Recognizing that 
the social handicap experienced by disabled persons often outweighs the 
actual physical restrictions of their impairments,26 civil rights advocates 
worked to remove these attitudinal barriers to social equality and economic 
opportunity.27




The shift to a civil rights model of disability ushered in the disability 
rights movement.
 
29  Emboldened by the efforts of other minority groups in 
the 1960s and 1970s to achieve equality, disability activists used tactics 
such as marches, protests, acts of civil disobedience, and litigation to 
advocate for change.30
In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress passed a number of federal laws 
prohibiting disability-based discrimination, including the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
 
31 the Voting Accessibility for the 
Elderly and Handicapped Act,32 the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986,33
 
 25. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act:  Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 
426–27 (1991) (explaining that under the civil rights model of disability, disabled persons 
are considered “equal citizens” who do not need charity, but rather the opportunity to 
“participate fully in society”); tenBroek & Matson, supra note 
 and 
22, at 816, 840; see also 
Burgdorf, supra note 23, at 249.  Professor Robert L. Burgdorf characterizes Professor 
tenBroek’s approach as an argument that a national policy of integrationism should control 
because “people with disabilities have a constitutional and legal right to live in the world, to 
freedom of movement within that world, and to equal access to places of public 
accommodation; and that artificial barriers that keep such individuals from moving about 
throughout society are or should be illegal.” Burgdorf, supra note 23, at 250 (citing Jacobus 
tenBroek, The Right To Live in the World:  The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. 
REV. 841, 848–52, 910–18 (1966)). 
 26. See tenBroek & Matson, supra note 22, at 814–16; see also tenBroek, supra note 25, 
at 842 (arguing that the “actual physical limitations resulting from the disability more often 
than not play little role in determining whether the physically disabled are allowed to move 
about and be in public places”). 
 27. See WEBER, supra note 21, at 1. 
 28. This slogan was used by activists during the disability rights movement. See 
Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 426 (citing Terri Schultz, The Handicapped, a Minority 
Demanding Its Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1977, at E8). 
 29. See Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 426–28; see also Burgdorf, supra note 23, at 247–48 
(noting that tenBroek’s theory of an integrationist approach to disability was “the conceptual 
foundation for the systematic use” of court actions challenging disability discrimination 
which “ultimately culminat[ed] in what we have come to call a Disability Rights 
Movement”). 
 30. See Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 427–28; see also Schultz, supra note 28, at E8 
(reporting that “thousands of the disabled are picketing, filing suits and lobbying for the 
equal protection promised but never received”). 
 31. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 
175–88 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)) (providing federal special 
education funding to states that guarantee children with disabilities a free, appropriate public 
education). 
 32. Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 
Stat. 1678 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee (2006)) (providing for accessible polling 
stations and nondiscrimination policies). 
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the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.34  However, the broadest and 
“most important” federal statute was section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973,35 which prohibits discrimination based on disability in programs 
receiving federal financial assistance.36
C.  The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
 
The Rehabilitation Act of 197337 was one of the first comprehensive 
federal laws enacted to benefit individuals with disabilities.38  Sections 501 
and 503 focus on employment, and prohibit disability discrimination by 
federal agencies and federal contractors, respectively.39  Section 502 
establishes the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance 
Board, charged with enforcing the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, while 
section 504 prohibits disability discrimination in any program or activity 
receiving federal funding.40
1.  Section 504:  Provisions 
 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his 
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”41
 
 33. Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified at 49 
U.S.C. § 41705 (2006)) (forbidding disability discrimination in commercial air 
transportation and establishing accessibility requirements). 
  The phrase “program or activity” is defined 
 34. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3614 (2006)) (prohibiting disability discrimination in 
housing). 
 35. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 701–795n (2006)). 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 794; Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 428; see also LAURA ROTHSTEIN & 
JULIA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW § 1:2, at 5 (4th ed. 2009) (deeming Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act the “most significant federal protection for individuals with 
disabilities” prior to the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–795n. 
 38. See id.; see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:17, at 53. 
 39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793; see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:17, 
at 54.  Under sections 501 and 503, federal agencies and contractors are not only prohibited 
from discriminating on the basis of disability, but are also required to use affirmative action 
programs to employ qualified individuals with disabilities. See COLKER, supra note 9, at 32. 
 40. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 792, 794; see also COLKER, supra note 9, at 32. 
 41. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (prohibiting disability discrimination by the United States Postal 
Service as well).  The nondiscrimination principle embodied by Section 504 was initially 
proposed as an amendment to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Alexander v. 
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295–96 n.13 (1985); H.R. 14033, 92d Cong., 118 CONG. REC. 9,712 
(1972); S. 3044, 92d Cong., 118 CONG. REC. 525–26 (1972);. See generally Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”).  After the amendment did not pass, Section 504 was added to the 
proposed Rehabilitation Act at the end of the legislative session—passing without debate. 
See COLKER, supra note 9, at 32. 
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as “all the operations” of a qualifying state or local government entity,42 
where any part of the entity is receiving federal funding.43
Section 504 was originally implemented through regulations promulgated 
by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).
 
44  The 
responsibility for issuing regulations to enforce section 504 was eventually 
transferred to the Department of Justice (DOJ).45  Additionally, the head of 
any federal department or agency that extends federal financial assistance, 
as well as the United States Postal Service, is required to issue regulations 
“as may be necessary” to implement the provisions of section 504.46  These 
regulations must be consistent with DOJ regulations.47
Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that the remedies of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 are available to persons protected by section 
504.
 
48  The remedies available to plaintiffs in the event of a section 504 
violation include:  the termination of federal funding, injunctive relief, 
damages, and attorney’s fees.49
 
 42. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1). 
 
 43. Id. § 794(b); see also 1 Americans with Disabilities:  Practice and Compliance 
Manual (West) § 1:88 (Apr. 2010).  The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 amended 
Section 504 to state that where a part of a program or activity receives federal funding, the 
entire program is subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of Section 504. See Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(B) (noting 
that Section 504 applies to state or local government entities that distribute federal funding 
“and each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to 
which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government”); 
see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:20, at 60. 
 44. See Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (Apr. 28, 1976); see also 
ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:2, at 6 (discussing Executive Order 11,914, in 
which President Gerald Ford mandated that the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) promulgate regulations under Section 504 in response to public displeasure 
over the lack of enforcement).  In 1980, HEW became the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS). Id. § 1:2, at 7.  Executive Order No. 11,914 was later revoked by Executive 
Order No. 12,250, in which President Jimmy Carter mandated that the Attorney General 
“coordinate the implementation and enforcement of” the nondiscrimination provisions of 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 
1980). 
 45. See ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:2, at 7. 
 46. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:2, at 7 
n.29 (“Each federal agency and department granting federal financial assistance is to 
promulgate its own regulations using the Department of Justice regulations as a guideline.”). 
 47. See 1 Americans with Disabilities:  Practice and Compliance Manual, supra note 43, 
§ 1:3. 
 48. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).  Section 505 was added to the Rehabilitation Act by 
amendment in 1978. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental 
Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982; see 
also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:2, at 7.  Though Title VI does not 
explicitly provide a private right of action, the U.S. Supreme Court has found “an implied 
right of action” and concluded that private individuals “‘may sue to enforce Title VI,’” and 
therefore have a private right of action under Section 504 and Title II. Barnes v. Gorman, 
536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001)) 
(holding that plaintiffs may seek compensatory, but not punitive, damages under Section 504 
and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)); see also infra notes 111–12. 
 49. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 1 Americans with Disabilities:  Practice and Compliance 
Manual, supra note 43, §§ 1:250–58; see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, 
§ 1:21–22, at 65–67.  Termination of federal funds is limited to the specific program or part 
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2.  Regulations Implementing Section 504 
Under the DOJ’s regulations that implement section 504, entities 
receiving federal financial assistance must ensure that “no qualified 
handicapped person is denied the benefits of, excluded from participation 
in, or otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
. . . because the recipient’s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by 
handicapped persons.”50  Any federally funded program or activity must, 
when “viewed in its entirety,” be “readily accessible to and usable by” 
persons with disabilities.51
However, while alterations to existing facilities must be accessible “to 
the maximum extent feasible,”
 
52 all existing facilities need not be readily 
accessible to comply with section 504.53  In choosing compliance methods 
for existing facilities, entities are required to “give priority to those methods 
that serve handicapped persons in the most integrated setting 
appropriate.”54  Additionally, though the statute does not expressly outline 
an undue burden standard, courts have interpreted section 504 not to require 
recipients of federal funds to take any action that would constitute an undue 
burden or fundamentally alter the nature of the program or activity in 
question.55
3.  Scope of Section 504 
 
The scope of section 504 is limited in that it only covers entities that 
receive federal financial assistance.56
 
of a program that was found to violate Section 504. See ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 
  Additionally, the plain language of 
36, § 1:21, at 65.  In an action brought under Section 504, compensatory damages are 
available only upon a showing of discriminatory intent or deliberate indifference. See, e.g., 
Ferguson v. City of Phx., 157 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 1998); Wood v. President & Trs. of 
Spring Hill Coll., 978 F.2d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 1992); see also 1 Americans with 
Disabilities:  Practice and Compliance Manual, supra note 43, § 1:252. 
 50. 28 C.F.R. § 42.520 (2010). 
 51. Id. § 42.521(a); see also Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and 
Local Government:  The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089, 1099 (1995) 
(explaining that in recognition of “the cost-effectiveness of accessible design,” the 
regulations subject new facilities to stricter requirements than existing facilities). 
 52. 28 C.F.R. § 42.522(a). 
 53. Id. § 42.521(a)–(b) (providing that recipients of federal financial assistance are “not 
required to make structural changes in existing facilities where other methods are effective in 
achieving compliance”); see also Weber, supra note 51, at 1099. 
 54. 28 C.F.R. § 42.521(b); see also Weber, supra note 51, at 1099. 
 55. See Weber, supra note 51, at 1103 (citing Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 
410, 414 (1979) (holding that the college’s “reasonable physical qualifications for admission 
to a clinical training program” did not violate Section 504, as “fundamental alteration[s] in 
the nature of a program” are beyond the sort of reasonable modification required by Section 
504)). 
 56. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006); Weber, supra note 51, at 
1110; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
366 (noting that Section 504 “prohibits discrimination only by recipients of [f]ederal 
financial assistance”); Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 429 (commenting that under Section 504 
and other pre-ADA nondiscrimination laws, “almost all activities and programs not funded 
by the federal government could freely discriminate on the basis of disability”). 
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the statute prohibits only discrimination “solely by reason” of disability, 
opening the door for narrow judicial interpretation of the statute.57
However, in Alexander v. Choate
 
58 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that “proof of discriminatory animus” is required to establish a 
cognizable claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and its 
implementing regulations.59  Examining the legislative history of section 
504, the Court reasoned that Congress had perceived disability 
discrimination to most often be the result, not of intentional discrimination, 
“but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect,” and 
pointed out that federal agencies have concluded that discrimination against 
disabled individuals “is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes.”60
Nevertheless, though the Court “assume[d] without deciding” that some 
disparate impact claims would be viable under section 504, it rejected the 
“boundless notion” that any showing of disparate impact would prove a 
prima facie section 504 claim.
 
61  Mindful of “the desire to keep § 504 
within manageable bounds,” the Court upheld a Medicaid plan that limited 
the annual number of hospitalization days covered by Medicaid, despite the 
fact that the plan had a greater negative impact on persons with 
disabilities.62
D.  The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
 
As the limitations of section 504 and other nondiscrimination statutes 
became apparent, disability rights activists began a push to amend civil 
rights statutes.63  In the mid-1980s, advocates attempted to amend the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to include individuals with disabilities.64
 
 57. See Weber, supra note 
  After those 
51, at 1110–11 & n.126 (discussing Cushing v. Moore, 783 F. 
Supp. 727, 734 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 970 F.2d 1103 (2d Cir. 
1992), in which the court, emphasizing the statutory phrase “solely by reason of,” found no 
cause of action to be available to the plaintiff, who alleged he was denied self-medication 
privileges in a public health program because he was disabled and unemployed). 
 58. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 59. Id. at 292–99; see also COLKER, supra note 9, at 555. 
 60. Choate, 469 U.S. at 295–96.  The Court further argued that it would “be difficult if 
not impossible” to effect much of the behavior Congress sought to change if the 
Rehabilitation Act was read to only prohibit intentional discrimination. Id. at 296–97 (noting 
that the elimination of architectural barriers was a “central aim[] of the [Rehabilitation] Act,” 
yet most were not erected purposely to exclude persons with disabilities (citing S. REP. NO. 
93-318, at 4 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2079)). 
 61. Id. at 298–99; see also WEBER, supra note 21, at 168 (commenting that the Court 
thought that requiring recipients of federal funds to assess every proposed action’s effect on 
the disabled would “be unwieldy and contrary to congressional intent”). 
 62. Choate, 469 U.S. at 289–99. 
 63. See Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 430–31 (“Experience with the application of . . . 
prior statutes, including section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, uncovered or 
highlighted weaknesses of such laws arising from their statutory language, the limited extent 
of their coverage, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and erratic judicial interpretations.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 64. See, e.g., H.R. 370, 99th Cong., H.R. 370, 99th Cong., 131 CONG. REC. 454 (1985) 
(statement of Rep. John Joseph Moakley); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 429. 
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efforts proved unsuccessful, advocates proposed a comprehensive federal 
statute prohibiting disability discrimination.65
1.  General Provisions:  Overview, Findings, and Purposes 
 
The ADA was enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.66  The 
overarching purpose of the ADA is “[t]o provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.”67  Additionally, the framers of the ADA sought to 
establish “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards” addressing 
disability discrimination, and “to ensure that the Federal government plays 
a central role” in enforcing those standards.68
Congress noted that at the time, forty-three million Americans had 
physical or mental impairments, and that the number would only increase as 
the population aged.
 
69  Congress reported that persons with disabilities had 
been historically isolated by society, and that disability discrimination 
“continue[d] to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”70  Congress 
outlined various forms of such discrimination—including “outright 
intentional exclusion,” architectural barriers, and “failure to make 
modifications to existing . . . practices.”71  Congress went on to note that 
unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination based on “race, 
color, sex, national origin, religion, or age,” people with disabilities had 
often been without legal recourse to address discrimination against them.72  
Congress concluded that persons with disabilities constituted a “discrete 
and insular minority”73
 
 65. See H.R. 4498, 100th Cong., 134 CONG. REC. 9604-08 (1988) (statement of Rep. 
Silvo O. Conte); S. 2345, 100th Cong., 134 CONG. REC. 9379-82 (1988); see also Burgdorf, 
supra note 
 and outlined the goals of achieving “equality of 
25, at 432. 
 66. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2006) 
(stating that one purpose of the ADA was “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, 
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order 
to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities”). 
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes 
.   . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
 68. Id. § 12101(b)(2)–(3). 
 69. Id. § 12101(a)(1); see also Pendo, supra note 1, at 904 (noting that “the number and 
percentage of people with . . . disabilities are expected to rise as the population ages” (citing 
BRAULT, supra note 11, at 4 (“As age increases so does the prevalence of disability.”))). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 435–36. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 435. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 435. 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 436 (arguing that this 
finding serves as “a Congressional endorsement” of the idea that disability is a “suspect” 
classification subject to “heightened judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause”). 
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opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency” for individuals with disabilities.”74
2.  Judicial Interpretation 
 
The five titles of the ADA prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
disability in a number of different contexts, including employment, the 
provision of public services, places of public accommodation, and 
communication services.75  Under the ADA, “disability” is defined as:  
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”76  
Between 1999 and 2002, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that 
narrowly interpreted the definition of disability under the “actually 
disabled” prong, further limiting the scope of protection provided by the 
ADA.77
In three cases decided on June 22, 1999, the Court ruled that mitigating 
measures must be taken into account when determining whether a person is 
disabled under the ADA.
 
78  In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,79 the lead 
case of the so-called “Sutton trilogy,” the plaintiffs argued that that they had 
been discriminated against on the basis of their disability because, although 
their corrected vision met United Airline’s 20/100 standard for 
employment, United rejected them because of their uncorrected vision.80  
The Court held that mitigating measures, such as glasses, “must be taken 
into account when judging whether [a] person is ‘substantially limited’ in a 
major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under the Act,” and concluded that 
the plaintiffs were not “actually disabled” because their corrected vision 
was 20/20.81
 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8); see also Burgdorf, supra note 
  The Court reiterated this holding in the other Sutton trilogy 
25, at 437 (reasoning that 
Congress’s inclusion of this finding establishes these four goals as “guiding stars to 
illuminate the interpretation of the Act’s provisions”). 
 75. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17, 12131–34, 12181–89, 12201–13; 47 U.S.C. § 225; see 
also John C. Coleman, III & Marcel L. Debruge, A Practitioner’s Introduction to ADA Title 
II, 45 ALA. L. REV. 55, 56 (1993); WEBER, supra note 21, at 5. 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substantially Limited Justice?:  
The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination, 
77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 225, 230 (2003).  This definition provides individuals with three 
methods of demonstrating they are covered by the ADA.  Individuals with a current physical 
or mental disability fall within the first prong, and are deemed “actually impaired.” See 
WEBER, supra note 21, at 25. 
 77. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1, 34 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. See Burgdorf, supra note 23, at 258–62. 
 79. 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553; see infra Part I.F. 
 80. 527 U.S. at 476.  The twin sister plaintiffs’ vision was 20/20 if they wore eyeglasses 
or contact lenses. Id. at 475.  Uncorrected, the plaintiffs’ vision was 20/200 in one eye and 
20/400 in the other eye. Id. 
 81. Id. at 482, 488–89. 
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cases:  Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg82 and Murphy v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc.83
In 2002 the Supreme Court further limited the ADA’s scope by narrowly 
interpreting the meaning of “major life activity.”
 
84  In Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,85 the Supreme Court held that a 
“major life activity” is one that involves the ability to perform the 
fundamental tasks essential to most people’s daily lives, not merely a task 
required by an individual’s specific job.86  The Court reasoned that the 
terms of the ADA “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding 
standard for qualifying as disabled.”87
E.  Title II:  Public Services 
 
Title II, the “public services” provision of the ADA, prohibits 
discrimination by public entities.88  Title II overlaps substantially with 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but expands Section 504’s 
obligations to cover governmental entities not receiving federal funding.89
 
 82. 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to take 
mitigating measures into account in determining whether plaintiff, who had 20/200 vision in 
his left eye and monocular vision, was disabled because plaintiff’s “brain ha[d] developed 
subconscious mechanisms for coping with [his] visual impairment,” and the Court saw “no 
principled basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like 
medications and devices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the 
body’s own systems” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
  
 83. 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (holding that a mechanic fired because of his high blood 
pressure did not meet the ADA definition of “disabled” because “when medicated, [his] high 
blood pressure [did] not substantially limit him in any major life activity”), superseded by 
statute, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553; see infra Part I.F. 
 84. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200–01 (2002), 
superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; see also Colker, supra note 77, 
at 61 (“[R]ecent decisions suggest that [the Supreme Court] is further constricting the scope 
of the ADA . . . most evident in the Court’s 2002 decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.”). 
 85. 534 U.S. 184 (2002), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553; 
see infra Part I.F. 
 86. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197–202.  The Court reversed the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s finding that the plaintiff was disabled because it 
inappropriately considered the plaintiff’s inability to do manual work in her specific 
occupation, due to carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis, as “sufficient proof that she was 
substantially limited in performing manual tasks” and disregarded the plaintiff’s ability to do 
household tasks such as brushing her teeth and bathing. Id. at 201–02. 
 87. Id. at 197. 
 88. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 201–04, 42 U.S.C. § 12131–34 
(2006); see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 56. 
 89. See Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 57; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) 
(“Except as otherwise provided . . . nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a 
lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 
U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.”); 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1998) (stating that § 12201(a) “requires [the 
Court] to construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by the 
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act”).  The legislative history of Title II 
explains that Congress intended that Title II “simply extend[] the anti-discrimination 
prohibition embodied in section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] to all actions of state and 
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Thus, government entities receiving federal financial assistance, i.e., most 
branches of state and local government, are governed by both Title II and 
Section 504.90
1.  Provisions 
 
The legislative history of Title II provides that Congress enacted Title II 
with the intent of “break[ing] down barriers to the integrative participation 
of people with disabilities in all aspects of community life.”91  Title II’s 
general discrimination prohibition provides that “no qualified individual 
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity.”92  The term “public entity” includes any state or local government93 
and their departments, agencies, special purpose districts, or other 
instrumentalities.94
2.  Regulations Implementing Title II 
 
The Attorney General is required to promulgate regulations to enforce the 
provisions of Title II.95  The regulations give effect to the Title II 
requirement that, “no qualified individual with a disability . . . be excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity.”96
 
local governments.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367. 
 
 90. See WEBER, supra note 21, at 163.  Additionally, because the ADA was modeled 
after the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II expressly provides that the remedies available under 
Section 504 also apply to Title II, courts have held that jurisprudence interpreting either 
Section 504 or Title II is applicable to both. See, e.g., Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 
(5th Cir. 2000). 
 91. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), at 49–50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
472–73; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523–25 (2004) (finding that Title II 
constituted a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power because Title II was passed 
against a backdrop of “pervasive” state discrimination in the allocation of public services 
against persons with disabilities, as documented in the legislative history of Title II, Supreme 
Court cases, state laws, and the decisions of other courts). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 57. 
 93. Title II covers only state and local governments, not the federal government. See 42 
U.S.C. § 12131(1).  Programs conducted by any executive agency or the United States Postal 
Service fall under the purview of Section 504. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also COLKER, 
supra note 9, at 508. 
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 57.  A 
“qualified individual with a disability” is defined as a person with a disability who, “with or 
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, 
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, 
meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C § 12131(2); see also Coleman 
& Debruge, supra note 75, at 57. 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a). 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
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To comply with the ADA, public entities must operate such that each 
program, service, or activity, “when viewed in its entirety,” is accessible to 
individuals with disabilities.97  The DOJ regulations explicitly prohibit 
public entities from excluding the disabled from services because of 
inaccessible or unusable facilities.98  A “facility” is defined as “all or any 
portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock 
or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real 
or personal property, including the site where the building, property, 
structure, or equipment is located.”99  New facilities constructed after 
January 26, 1992 must be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals 
with disabilities.”100  Any alteration of a facility that “could affect the 
usability of the facility or part of the facility” must be readily accessible to 
the “maximum extent feasible.”101
Existing facilities are subject to a program access standard, meaning that 
public entities are not “necessarily require[d]” to make every existing 
facility accessible, as long as the entity’s programs, services, or activities 
are accessible “when viewed in [their] entirety.”
 
102  A public entity does not 
have to make structural changes to existing facilities if the entity can 
achieve compliance through other methods.103  Additionally, public entities 
are not required to make existing facilities accessible where doing so 
“would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, 
program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.”104
 
 97. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2010 and Mar. 15, 2011 amendments); see also Coleman & 
Debruge, supra note 
 
75, at 87 (noting that the Title II regulations “focus first and foremost 
on access to the program or service, not access to the facility”). 
 98. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (“Except as otherwise provided . . . no qualified individual 
with a disability shall, because a public entity’s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by 
individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity . . . .”); see also John W. Parry, State & 
Local Government Services Under the ADA:  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability, 
15 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 615, 618 (1991) (noting that “[p]rogram 
inaccessibility constitutes illegal discrimination”). 
 99. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. 
 100. Id. § 35.151(a); see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 89. 
 101. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b); see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 89. 
 102. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., DISABILITY 
RIGHTS SECTION, THE AMS. WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
MANUAL, § II-5.1000 (1993).  The DOJ’s Interpretive Guidance for ADA Title II notes that 
Title II requires existing facilities to comply with a program access standard “because the 
cost of retrofitting existing facilities is often prohibitive.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.150. 
 103. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, § II-
5.2000 (“A public entity must make its ‘programs’ accessible.  Physical changes to a 
building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program 
accessible.”). 
 104. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3); see also id. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.150 (cautioning that 
“Congress intended the ‘undue burden’ standard in Title II to be significantly higher than the 
‘readily achievable’ standard in Title III” and stating that Title II’s program access 
requirement “should enable individuals with disabilities to participate in and benefit from the 
services, programs, or activities of public entities in all but the most unusual cases”).  In the 
House Report on the ADA, Congress acknowledged that the requirement of program access 
in existing facilities is subject to an undue burden standard. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), at 50 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473.  However, Congress also praised the 
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When a public entity with fifty or more employees decides to structurally 
modify existing facilities to achieve accessibility, the entity must develop a 
transition plan “identify[ing] physical obstacles in facilities that limit the 
accessibility of [government] programs or activities,” and outline a process 
for making those facilities accessible to the disabled.105  A public entity that 
has authority over streets, roads, or walkways must include in its transition 
plan a schedule for providing curb cuts, “giving priority to walkways 
serving entities covered by the Act, including State and local government 
offices and facilities, transportation, places of public accommodation, and 
employers, followed by walkways serving other areas.”106
Finally, any “[n]ewly constructed or altered streets, roads, and highways 
must contain curb ramps or other sloped areas” at intersections featuring 
curbs or other such barriers to sidewalk access.
 
107  Newly constructed or 
altered sidewalks must feature curb ramps at intersections as well.108
3.  Enforcement of Title II and Remedies for a Violation Thereof 
 
The requirements of Title II are enforced through the “remedies, 
procedures, and rights set for forth in Section 794a of title 29 [section 505 
of the Rehabilitation Act].”109  As discussed in Part I.C.1, section 505 
incorporates the remedies, procedures, and rights available under Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.110
In Barnes v. Gorman,
 
111 the Supreme Court recognized that individuals 
have a private cause of action to enforce both Section 504 and Title II.112  
The Court explained that its prior decisions had recognized an “implied 
[private] right of action” to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and that the remedies available for claims under Section 504 and Title II are 
“coextensive with the remedies . . . brought under Title VI.”113
 
“long-range” societal benefits of the integration of people with disabilities despite the “short-
term” yet “substantial” financial and administrative burdens. Id. 
  However, 
 105. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d). 
 106. Id. § 35.150(d)(2). 
 107. Id. § 35.151(e)(1) (to be codified at section 35.151(i)(1) after Mar. 15, 2011 
amendments to the Title II regulations); see also Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1075 
(3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the “resurfacing of the city streets is an alteration within the 
meaning of 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b) which must be accompanied by the installation of curb 
cuts under 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(e)”). 
 108. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(e)(2) (to be codified at section 35.151(i)(2) after Mar. 15, 2011 
amendments).  The legislative history of the ADA reveals that Congress explicitly 
recognized the importance of mandating curb cuts under Title II, stating that “[t]he 
employment, transportation, and public accommodation sections of this Act would be 
meaningless if people who use wheelchairs were not afforded the opportunity to travel on 
and between the streets.” See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), at 84, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367. 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006). 
 110. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2006); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 111. 536 U.S. 181 (2002). 
 112. See id. at 184–85. 
 113. Id. at 185; see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279–80 (2001) (“[I]t is clear 
from our decisions [and] from Congress’s amendments of Title VI [that] private individuals 
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exactly what government conduct gives rise to a private cause of action 
under Title II has been the subject of debate.114
In Alexander v. Sandoval
 
115 the Supreme Court held that individuals do 
not have a private cause of action to enforce disparate impact regulations 
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.116  The Court 
explained that “private rights of action to enforce federal law must be 
created by Congress,” and therefore only regulations that “simply apply” 
the provisions of a controlling statute can be enforced through a private 
cause of action.117  Title VI, by its terms, prohibits only intentional 
discrimination.118  As such, the Court held that disparate impact regulations 
are not encompassed within the private right to enforce Title VI.119
In the wake of Sandoval, some courts have distinguished between Title 
VI and Section 504 or Title II, and concluded that disparate impact claims 
brought under Section 504 or Title II are actionable.
 
120  Courts 
distinguishing Sandoval note that the Choate Court rejected the notion that 
Section 504 bars only intentional discrimination, and implied that some 
disparate impact claims would be valid.121
Defendants have also argued, in light of Sandoval, that plaintiffs only 
have a private right of action to enforce ADA regulations when the claims 




may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief and damages.”); 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979). 
  In Ability Center of Greater 
 114. It is also worth noting that some states have sought to challenge the constitutionality 
of Title II under the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity. See generally 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).  However, because 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity protects only states, not counties or 
municipalities, sovereign immunity has not been an issue in the conflict regarding whether 
Title II covers public sidewalks, and is therefore beyond the scope of this Note. See Lincoln 
Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (“The Eleventh Amendment limits the 
jurisdiction only as to suits against a State.”).  For a discussion of how the doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity impacts Title II actions brought against state entities, see COLKER, supra 
note 9, ch. 6.B. 
 115. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 116. Id. at 293 (“Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display 
an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated 
under § 602.  We therefore hold that no such right of action exists.”). 
 117. Id. at 285–86. 
 118. Id. at 280 (“[I]t is . . . beyond dispute—and no party disagrees—that § 601 prohibits 
only intentional discrimination.”). 
 119. Id. at 293. 
 120. See COLKER, supra note 9, at 555. 
 121. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 538 (E.D. Pa. 
2001) (“[W]hile the conduct regulated by section 601 of Title VI is limited to intentional 
discrimination, the same cannot be said for section 504.  With section 504, Congress clearly 
sought to remedy a problem of a different, and for these purposes broader, nature.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 122. See id. at 538–39 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that the “[p]laintiffs’ ADA 
claims must be dismissed in accordance with Sandoval”); see also Access Living v. Chi. 
Transit Auth., No. 00-C-0770, 2001 WL 492473, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2001) (“Defendant 
argues that plaintiffs have failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination under the 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act because they have failed to present evidence of intentional 
discrimination . . . .”). 
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Toledo v. City of Sandusky,123 plaintiffs filed a class action claiming that 
the city:  (1) did not comply with 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 when replacing and 
repairing sidewalks and (2) “failed to adopt a transition plan” in accordance 
with 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d).124  The city argued that under Sandoval, 
individuals do not have a private right of action under Title II to enforce 
Title II regulations.125  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
relying on Choate, found that Title II does not merely prohibit invidious 
discrimination, but also requires public entities to make reasonable 
accommodations, and “contemplates that such accommodations must 
sometimes come in the form of public entities removing architectural 
barriers that impede [the] disabled.”126  The court concluded that 28 C.F.R 
§ 35.151 clearly “imposes requirements specifically envisioned” by Title II, 
and is therefore “enforceable through Title II’s private cause of action.”127
A plaintiff bringing a private cause of action under Title II generally must 
show that:  (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he is being 
excluded from participation in, or being denied the benefits of, a public 
entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) he was excluded or denied 
the benefit solely on the basis of his disability.
 
128
The phrase “program, services, or activities” is not defined in Title II nor 
in the implementing regulations promulgated by the DOJ.  However, a 
number of federal circuit courts have embraced a broad definition of 
“services, programs, or activities.”
 
129  In Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. 
City of White Plains,130 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
found that “[a]ll governmental activities of public entities are covered” 
under Title II.131  Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
has held that Congress intended that the phrase “apply to anything a public 
entity does,” and therefore found that Title II applies to state and local 
correctional facilities.132
 
 123. 385 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 
 124. Id. at 903. 
 125. See id. at 904. 
 126. Id. at 907. 
 127. Id. at 910, 913.  However, the court found that the transition plan requirement of 28 
C.F.R. § 35.150(d) did “more than simply apply or effectuate [Title II],” and that, therefore, 
plaintiffs had no private right of action to force the city to adopt a transition plan. Id. at 914–
15. 
 128. See, e.g., Melton v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Lightbourn v. Cnty. of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1997)); Lovell v. 
Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. 
Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 129. See Laurence Paradis, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act:  Making Programs, Services, and Activities Accessible to All, 14 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 395–99 (2003). But see Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 
476, 485–86 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1 
(5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011). 
 130. 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1997), superseded on other grounds, Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., 
Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 171 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 131. Innovative Health Sys., Inc., 117 F.3d at 45 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A); 28 
C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 456 (2010)); see also Paradis, supra note 129, at 397. 
 132. Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 C.F.R. 
pt. 35, app. A, at 456), aff’d, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a statute can be 
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As with Section 504, the remedies available in a private cause of action 
under Title II include attorney fees, injunctive relief, and compensatory 
damages.133  Punitive damages are not available in a private suit under Title 
II.134  Courts have generally held that compensatory damages are only 
available upon a showing of intentional discrimination.135
F.  The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the Sutton trilogy and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing were met with criticism from the disability rights 
community, who argued that the Court’s pro-defendant interpretation of the 
ADA was inconsistent with congressional intent.136  Advocates pointed out 
the “Catch-22” created by the Court’s approach to mitigating measures, 
under which a person could be considered “too impaired” to be hired, yet 
not impaired enough to fall under the protection of the ADA.137
On September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008
 
138 (ADAAA) into law.139  In enacting the 
ADAAA, Congress sought to “restore the intent and protections of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”140
 
‘applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.  
It demonstrates breadth.’” (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 
(1985))).  Additionally, the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have 
found that Title II applies to “virtually everything that a public entity does.” Johnson v. City 
of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998); see Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc., 
v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding Title II covers 
“anything a public entity does” (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A)). 
  Congress determined that the 
Supreme Court, in the Sutton trilogy, had “narrowed the broad scope of 
 133. See supra notes 49, 109 and accompanying text; see also Paradis, supra note 129, at 
391–95. 
 134. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002); see also supra note 49 and 
accompanying text. 
 135. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Phx., 157 F.3d 668, 674–75 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that plaintiffs must prove intentional discrimination in order to receive compensatory 
damages under Section 504 or Title II, but declining to decide whether a “discriminatory 
animus” or “deliberate indifference” standard is proper, as the plaintiff’s claims did not pass 
either test). 
 136. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 77, at 34 (arguing that Congress intended to cover 
individuals with “both mild and severe disabilities” under the ADA, “[y]et, the Court has 
interpreted the ADA inconsistently with that intent, resulting in the ADA . . . only covering 
those too disabled to work”). 
 137. WEBER, supra note 21, at 19–20; see also Pendo, supra note 76, at 261–62 
(concluding that in the wake of the Sutton trilogy, “employers [were] free to reject fully 
capable workers with correctable impairments without fear of an ADA claim because those 
workers [were] not ‘disabled’ as defined by the Court”). 
 138. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553. 
 139. 154 CONG. REC. S 9626 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2008) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) 
(noting that the ADAAA passed with “overwhelming, bipartisan support in the Senate and 
House of Representatives”). 
 140. § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553; see 154 CONG. REC. S9626 (“Simply put, the ADA 
Amendments Act restores the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act to the civil rights 
law it was meant to be.”). 
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protection intended to be afforded by the ADA”—excluding individuals 
Congress had meant to cover.141
The ADAAA explicitly rejects the Sutton trilogy requirement that 
mitigating measures be taken into account in determining whether a person 
is “substantially limited” with respect to a major life activity, as well as 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing’s rule that only those activities “of central 




G.  Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
 
As the Sutton trilogy and the ADAAA demonstrate, the breadth of the 
ADA’s scope intended by Congress has not always been clear.  In Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,143 the Supreme 
Court outlined the two-step process governing judicial interpretation of a 
statute administered by an executive agency.144  First, a court must look to 
the statute and determine if Congress directly addressed the given issue.145  
If, using the “traditional tools of statutory construction,” the court 
concludes that the intent of Congress was unambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue in question, the court must give effect to that clear intent.146
To determine legislative intent, courts first turn to the plain language of 
the statute.
 
147  Though a word must be given its ordinary meaning,148 the 
words used in a given statute should be considered in context, based upon a 
reading of the statutory text in its entirety.149  If possible, a court must 
construe the statute in a way that gives every word “some operative 
effect.”150
 
 141. § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553. 
  However, courts may “reject words ‘as surplusage’” if 
 142. Id. at 3554; see supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.  Congress declared that 
the strict standard for “substantially limits” created by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing “created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain 
coverage under the ADA.” § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554. 
 143. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 144. See id. at 842–43; see also Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters:  
The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 232–
33 (2008). 
 145. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 146. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 147. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (“In a 
statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and 
when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in 
all but the most extraordinary circumstances, is finished.” (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 
498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991))). 
 148. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a word is not defined 
by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.” (citing 
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))). 
 149. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); see also Deal v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (discussing the “fundamental principle of statutory 
construction” that a court must determine the meaning of a word, not in isolation, but in light 
of the context in which the word is used). 
 150. Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192, 1195–96 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United 
States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992)). 
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“repugnant to the rest of the statute.”151  In interpreting a word or phrase, a 
court should consider the purpose of the statute, and “consult[] any 
precedents or authorities” that may be relevant to the analysis.152
If a court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the question at issue, the court must then turn to the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute.
 
153  So long as the agency interpretation is 
“based on a permissible construction of the statute,” a court must defer to 
that interpretation.154  However, an agency’s interpretation only merits 
deference “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”155
In discerning the agency’s interpretation of a statute, courts first look to 
any regulations the agency has promulgated that address the question at 
issue.
 
156  If an agency regulation is unambiguous, and a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute, a court must give effect to that regulation.157
 Only when the language of an agency regulation is ambiguous may a court 
look to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.
 
158  An agency’s 
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is entitled to deference under 
Auer v. Robbins,159 unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”160
 
 151. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001). 
 
 152. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486. 
 153. See Chickasaw, 534 U.S. at 94 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION 525 (1960)). 
 154. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  
Additionally, though courts “must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to 
clear congressional intent,” an agency interpretation does not have to be the only permissible 
interpretation of the statutory provision, or even the interpretation the court would have 
reached itself, to be entitled to deference. Id. at 843 n.9 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981)). 
 155. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see David Goodman, 
Recent Case, Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), 74 TENN. L. REV. 437, 446 (2007) 
(discussing the Court’s “force of law” analysis in United States v. Mead Corp.); see also 
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (stating that agency interpretations, 
such as opinion letters, that “lack the force of law[,] do not warrant Chevron-style deference” 
(citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995))).  An agency interpretation that lacks the 
force of law is “‘entitled to respect’ only to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade.’” 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944)); see Graham, supra note 144, at 241 (discussing the “very limited” 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. deference standard). 
 156. See Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 476, 483 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc 
granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011). 
 157. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (noting that where Congress has expressly 
delegated an agency the authority to “elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation,” the agency regulation controls unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute”).  Even where the legislative delegation was “implicit rather than 
explicit,” the agency construction will be given effect if reasonable. Id. at 844. 
 158. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 159. Id. (deferring to the Department of Labor’s amicus brief in interpreting an 
ambiguous agency regulation promulgated to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act).  In 
Gonzales, the Supreme Court distinguished Chevron from Auer, explaining that Chevron 
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II.  ARE PUBLIC SIDEWALKS CONSIDERED “SERVICES, PROGRAMS, OR 
ACTIVITIES” WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE II? 
Courts have disagreed over whether citizens have a private right of action 
under Title II to compel a city to maintain public curbs, sidewalks, and 
parking lots in compliance with ADA regulations.  Specifically, circuits 
have split regarding whether public sidewalks are considered “services, 
programs, or activities” within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
Part II examines the split between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit regarding 
whether public sidewalks qualify as “services, programs, or activities” 
covered by Title II.  Part II.A outlines the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that 
public sidewalks are considered “services, programs, or activities” within 
the meaning of Title II, and therefore must comport with the accessibility 
requirements of the Title II regulations.  Part II.B details the Fifth Circuit’s 
contrary determination that public sidewalks are facilities, and therefore not 
automatically subject to Title II’s nondiscrimination provisions. 
A.  Broad Interpretation:  Sidewalks Are “Services, Programs, or 
Activities” Subject to the Title II Regulations 
The Ninth Circuit has endorsed a broad interpretation of “services, 
programs, or activities,” concluding that the ADA’s “fundamental purpose” 
of eliminating disability discrimination is best served by including public 
sidewalks within the phrase “services, programs, or activities.”161  This 
section discusses the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Barden v. City of 
Sacramento162
 
deference applies when interpreting an ambiguous statute, whereas Auer deference applies 
when interpreting an ambiguous agency regulation. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255; see Graham, 
supra note 
 that public sidewalks are a “service, program, or activity” 
within the meaning of Title II, and are thus subject to the program 
accessibility requirements of the Title II regulations.  First, this section 
outlines the court’s argument that precedent, the plain language of the 
Rehabilitation Act, and the legislative history of Title II support a broad 
interpretation of Title II.  Then, it details the court’s determination that, 
though consistent with the conclusion that sidewalks fall within the scope of 
Title II, the regulations are ultimately ambiguous.  Next, it examines the 
court’s decision, in light of the ambiguity of the Title II regulations, to defer 
to the DOJ’s position that public sidewalks are subject to the regulations’ 
accessibility requirements.  Finally, this section discusses the Supreme 
144, at 239–41. 
 160. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting Udall v. 
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).  The Court explained that an agency’s interpretation of its 
own regulations must be afforded “substantial deference” and will be given effect unless an 
“alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications 
of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.” Id. at 512 (quoting 
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)). 
 161. Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hason v. 
Med. Bd., 279 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 162. 292 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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Court’s decision to deny review, and the state of disability rights advocacy 
in the wake of Barden. 
In 1999, a group of individuals with mobility and vision impairments 
brought a class action against the city of Sacramento, alleging that the city 
had violated Title II and section 504 by failing to maintain existing public 
sidewalks and to make them accessible to persons with disabilities.163  The 
plaintiffs argued that the city’s failure to remove obstacles such as benches, 
sign-posts, and wires violated the program accessibility requirements of 
Title II’s implementing regulations.164  The District Court for the Eastern 
District of California partially granted the city’s motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that public sidewalks were not a “service, program, 
or activity” under Title II.165  The plaintiffs appealed, and a group of 
fourteen disability rights organizations filed an amicus brief in support of 
the plaintiffs,166 as did the Department of Justice.167
On June 12, 2002, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding 
that public sidewalks constitute “services” within the meaning of Title II of 
the ADA and are therefore subject to the accessibility requirements of the 
ADA regulations.
 
168  The court determined that a broad reading of the term 
“services, programs, or activities” was supported by precedent, the plain 
language of the Rehabilitation Act, the legislative history of Title II, and the 
DOJ’s interpretation of its own regulation.169
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit first pointed to the broad interpretation 
of the phrase “service, program, or activity” by the U.S. Courts of Appeals 




 163. See id. at 1075.  The plaintiffs also claimed that the city’s failure to install curb cuts 
in newly constructed or altered sidewalks was a violation of Title II, but that issue was 
settled before the case reached the Ninth Circuit. See id. (reporting that the “parties 
stipulated to the entry of an injunction regarding the curb ramps”); see also Cahill, supra 
note 
  Echoing the reasoning of the 
14, at 9 (reporting that in the settlement the city agreed to install a specific number of 
curb cuts over a thirty-year period). 
 164. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1075; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149–51 (2010 and Mar. 15, 2011 
amendments). 
 165. See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1075. 
 166. Brief for Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal, Barden, 292 
F.3d 1073 (No. 01-15744), 2001 WL 34095025 (submitted on behalf of the Western Law 
Center for Disability Rights (WLCDR), the American Association of People with 
Disabilities (AAPD), the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems 
(NAPAS), the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Inc. (DREDF), the United 
Cerebral Palsy Association (UCP), Protection and Advocacy, Inc. (PAI), the National Senior 
Citizens Law Center, ADAPT, the California Council of the Blind (CCB), the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), the Gray Panthers, the National Multiple Sclerosis 
Society, Californians for Disability Rights (CDR), and the California Foundation for 
Independent Living Centers (CFILC)). 
 167. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Barden, 292 
F.3d 1073 (No. 01-15744), 2001 WL 354095025. 
 168. See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1074. 
 169. See id. at 1076–78. 
 170. See id. at 1076 (citing Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’d, 524 U.S. 206 (1998); 
Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997), 
superseded on other grounds, Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 171 n.7 (2d Cir. 
2001)); see also supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
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Second Circuit in Innovative Health Systems, the Ninth Circuit noted the 
inefficiency of requiring courts to engage in the sort of “hair-splitting” that 
would be involved in determining which public functions technically 
qualify as “services, programs, or activities.”171
Following the precedent set by Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
 
172 in which it 
embraced the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Title II’s plain language as 
“bring[ing] within its scope ‘anything a public entity does,’”173 the court 
reasoned that the proper question was not whether a public function could 
technically be considered a service, program, or activity, but rather 
“whether it is ‘a normal function of a governmental entity.’”174  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that maintaining a system of public sidewalks is “without 
a doubt something that the [City] ‘does,’” and therefore falls under the 
purview of Title II.175
The court next turned to the plain language of the statute.
 
176  The court 
acknowledged that the phrase “services, programs, or activities” is not 
defined in the ADA, but noted that the Rehabilitation Act defines “program 
or activity” as “all the operations” of an eligible state or local 
government.177  Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the legislative history of 
the ADA provides that Title II “‘simply extends the anti-discrimination 
prohibition embodied in § 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] to all actions of 
state and local governments.’”178
The court next examined the language of the program accessibility 
requirements set forth in Title II’s implementing regulations.
 
179  The court 
noted that though section 35.150 prioritizes the provision of curb ramps for 
“walkways serving government offices, ‘transportation, places of public 
accommodation, and employers,’” the regulation mandates that curb cuts be 
installed in “‘walkways serving other areas’” as well.180  The court 
explained that section 35.150’s requirement that curb cuts be installed in all 
sidewalks evidenced a “general concern for the accessibility of public 
sidewalks” and a “recognition” that public sidewalks fall within the scope 
of the ADA.181
 
 171. Id. at 1076 (quoting Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 45). 
  However, the court concluded that in spite of this, the 
 172. 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 173. Id. at 691 (quoting Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 171). 
 174. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment, Inc., 
v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 175. Id. (quoting Hason v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 176. See id. at 1076–77. 
 177. Id. at 1077; see Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(B) (2006); 
supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 178. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 84 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367); see also supra note 90 (stating that because Title 
II is modeled after section 504, precedent interpreting either is applicable to both). 
 179. See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1075–77 (detailing the provisions of 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149–
151 (2010)); see also supra Part I.E.2. 
 180. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077 (quoting 28 C.F.R § 35.150(d)(2)); see supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 181. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077 (citing 28 C.F.R § 35.150). 
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regulation is ambiguous because it provides for curb ramps but does not 
specifically mention sidewalks.182
Deeming the language of section 35.150 ambiguous, the court turned to 
the interpretation provided by the DOJ, the agency responsible for 
promulgating the accessibility regulations.
 
183  The DOJ took the position 
that sidewalks are subject to the program accessibility requirements of Title 
II.184  The DOJ’s interpretation is entitled to deference under Auer, the 
court explained, unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”185
The court explained that because, logically, mandating curb ramps would 
be useless unless the sidewalks between were required to be accessible, the 
DOJ’s stance was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the language of 
section 35.150.
 
186  Consequently, the court deferred to the DOJ’s 
interpretation of its own regulation.187  Based on the foregoing analysis, the 
Ninth Circuit held that sidewalks do constitute a “service, program, or 
activity . . . within the meaning of Title II,” and thus must comply with the 
program accessibility requirements of the Title II regulations.188  The court 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether bringing the 
sidewalk system into compliance would impose “undue financial and 
administrative burdens” on the city of Sacramento.189
After the city of Sacramento filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the 
Supreme Court, the Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief 
expressing the opinion of the United States, which the Solicitor General did 
in May of 2003.
 
190  In its amicus brief, the Solicitor General opined that the 
Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that public sidewalks are subject to the 
accessibility requirements of Title II.191  On June 27, 2003, the Supreme 
Court denied review in Barden.192
 
 182. Id. at 1077. 
 
 183. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2006); supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note 
167, at 5–7; see also Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077; Cahill, supra note 14, at 9 (reporting that the 
Ninth Circuit cited an amicus brief submitted by the DOJ, concluding that sidewalks are 
subject to program accessibility regulations). 
 185. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); 
Alhambra Hosp. v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 186. Id.; see supra notes 97, 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 187. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077; see also 1 Americans with Disabilities:  Practice and 
Compliance Manual, supra note 43, § 2:26 (stating that in Barden, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the “Department of Justice’s interpretation of its own accessibility regulation under the 
ADA . . . was entitled to deference . . . where the regulation was ambiguous, since it 
addressed curb ramps but not sidewalks, and such interpretation was not plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation”). 
 188. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1074. 
 189. Id. at 1078 & n.6 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (2010)). 
 190. See City of Sacramento v. Barden, 537 U.S. 1231, 1231 (2003) (“The Solicitor 
General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.”); see 
also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, City of Sacramento v. Barden, 539 U.S. 
958 (2003) (No. 02-815), available at http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2002/2pet/6invit/ 
2002-0815.pet.ami.inv.pdf. 
 191. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 190, at 7–8 (reasoning 
that Sacramento’s provision of a public sidewalk system constituted a fundamental service, 
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Barden was heralded as a major victory for disability rights advocates, 
and has inspired disability rights advocates to file similar lawsuits in cities 
across the country.193  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Indiana recently considered whether the “services, programs, or activities” 
of a city includes public sidewalks in Culvahouse v. City of Laporte.194  
The court, in line with Barden, found that Title II is “broad enough to 
include public sidewalks within the scope of a city’s services, programs, or 
activities.”195
In August of 2006, Californians for Disability Rights (CDR), the 
California Counsel for the Blind, and California residents Ben Rockwell 
and Dmitri Belser filed a class action lawsuit against the California 
Department of Transportation (Caltrans), among other parties, alleging that 
Caltrans had failed to make existing sidewalks and Park and Ride facilities 
accessible to individuals with disabilities.
 
196  On June 2, 2010, the District 
Court for the Northern District of California approved a settlement 
agreement in which Caltrans agreed to spend $1.1 billion over the next 
thirty years to remove barriers and improve sidewalk accessibility in 
California.197
 
and that when a resident is denied the use of that sidewalk system because the sidewalks are 
inaccessible, “he or she is ‘excluded from,’ and ‘denied the benefits of,’ the ‘services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006))); see also 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., DISABILITY RIGHTS SECTION, ENFORCING THE 
ADA:  A STATUS REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2–3 (2003), available at 
http://www.ada.gov/aprjun03prt.pdf (stating that the DOJ’s brief also argued that 
Sacramento’s concern that it would incur “staggering costs” was unfounded in light of “title 
II’s undue financial and administrative burdens defense”). 
 
 192. See City of Sacramento v. Barden, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (denying certiorari); see also 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 191, at 2 (reporting that the Supreme Court declined to 
review Barden). 
 193. See Joyner, supra note 10, at 3A (describing Scott Crawford’s lawsuit against the 
city of Jackson, Mississippi, as “aimed at getting the city to comply with ADA standards by 
making sidewalks, bus stops and other public areas accessible to the disabled”); see also 
Elizabeth Campbell, Disabled Arlington Man Continues His Quest for Access, STAR-
TELEGRAM, Sept. 11, 2010, http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/09/11/2461097/disabled-
arlington-man-continues.html (reporting twenty lawsuits filed by the Texas Civil Rights 
Project and ADAPT of Texas alleging that Texas cities, counties, and businesses have 
violated the ADA in a range of ways, including inaccessible sidewalks). 
 194. 679 F. Supp. 2d 931, 939 (N.D. Ind. 2009). 
 195. Id. at 939 (citing Frame v. City of Arlington, 575 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability), withdrawn and 
superseded on reh’g, 616 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010)). 
 196. See Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., No. C 06-5125, 
2009 WL 2982840, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 14, 2009); see also Joyner, supra note 10, at 3A 
(noting that California faced “potentially billions of dollars in sidewalk-repair costs” should 
it lose). 
 197. Californians for Disability Rights, Inc., v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., No. C 06-5125, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62837, at *6, 28 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2010) (approving settlement in 
which Caltrans agreed to:  (1) a commitment to a spend $1.1 billion over the next thirty years 
to make walkways more accessible; (2) a “monitoring procedure” to oversee compliance 
during the first seven years and mandatory annual reporting for thirty years; (3) a “grievance 
procedure” to handle public complaints regarding accessibility; and (4) a payment of 
attorney’s fees not less than $3.75 million but not to exceed $8.75 million for “past work and 
future compliance services”); see also Riya Bhattacharjee, Caltrans Settles Class Action 
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B.  Narrow Interpretation:  Public Sidewalks Are Facilities, Do Not Qualify 
as “Services, Programs, or Activities” Under Title II 
Not all courts have found the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of Title 
II persuasive.  The Northern District of Indiana, though agreeing in 
Culvahouse that sidewalks constitute a “service, program, or activity” of a 
public entity within the meaning of Title II, chose not to endorse the Ninth 
Circuit interpretation of “programs, services, or activities” as “anything a 
public entity does.”198  In addition, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, in an unpublished opinion, explicitly disagreed with the 
Ninth Circuit and concluded that sidewalks are “facilities” that do not 
themselves constitute “programs, services, or activities” under the ADA.199  
The court pointed out that the ADA regulations include sidewalks in the 
definition of “facilities” and argued that while a public entity must ensure 
that its services are accessible, the regulations do not require that each 
existing facility be made readily accessible.200
Part II.B details the argument in favor of a narrow interpretation of Title 
II, under which public sidewalks do not in themselves qualify as “services, 
programs, or activities.”  Part II.B.1 examines the concern presented by city 
advocates that deeming sidewalks “services” under the ADA imposes 
significant fiscal burdens on cities and municipalities.  Part II.B.2 outlines 
the Fifth Circuit’s determination in Frame v. City of Arlington
 
201 that a 
narrow interpretation of the phrase “services, programs, or activities” is 
proper given the “clear” congressional intent to distinguish between 
“physical infrastructures” and the “services to which they provide 
access.”202
 
Disability-Access Lawsuit, BERKELEY DAILY PLANET, Jan. 07, 2010, 
http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2010-01-07/article/34425 (reporting Caltrans’ 
announcement of the settlement agreement, a “landmark achievement for disability rights 
advocates”).  California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger lauded the agreement as “a 
victory for all Californians—taxpayers and the disability community who have a right to 
equal access to all walkways.” Id. at 22. 
 
 198. See Culvahouse 679 F. Supp. 2d at 939 (acknowledging that “the [ADA] may not 
mandate that the phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ encompass, without exception, all 
things that a public entity does” (citing Frame, 575 F.3d at 437)). 
 199. See N.J. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc., v. Twp. of Riverside, No. 04-5914, 2006 WL 
2226332, at *3 & n.4 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2006) (noting that the Title II regulations “explicitly 
refer to walks and roadways as ‘facilities,’ rather than activities, programs, or services”).  
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey argued that the fact that a city provides 
the service of maintaining a facility does not make the facility a service, and that such a 
reading would render 28 C.F.R § 35.104 superfluous. See id. at *3 (maintaining that the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Barden “ignores the distinction between a city’s responsibility to 
maintain sidewalks and the enterprises ordinarily deemed programs, services, and 
activities.”). 
 200. See id. at *2. 
 201. 616 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 
242385 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011). 
 202. Id. at 485–86. 
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1.  Policy Considerations in Favor of a Narrow Interpretation of “Services, 
Programs, or Activities” 
Those opposed to a broad reading of Title II argue that public policy 
weighs against deeming public sidewalks “services” under the ADA.203  In 
Barden, over seventy-five California cities joined the National League of 
Cities’ amicus brief in support of the city of Sacramento.204  When the 
Ninth Circuit ruled against Sacramento, hundreds of cities offered to 
support Sacramento’s efforts to have the Ninth Circuit’s ruling overturned 
by the Supreme Court, including Phoenix, Denver, and New York City.205
City advocates argue that the Ninth Circuit failed to appreciate the 
financial implications of requiring cities to ensure sidewalks are readily 
accessible to people with disabilities.
 
206  Local government representatives 
frame the issue as a “stand against unfunded federal mandates” and contend 
that cities simply do not have the resources to bring miles of public 
sidewalk into immediate compliance with Title II regulations.207
 
 203. See Brief of the National League of Cities and 76 Cal. Cities as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Appellees at 3–6, Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(No. 01-15744), 2001 WL 34095218 at *3–6 [hereinafter Brief of the National League of 
Cities] (arguing that under the “clear language” of the ADA regulations, a public entity is 
only required to remove the “‘physical obstacles in [its] facilities that limit the accessibility 
of its programs or activities to individuals with disabilities’” (quoting 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.150(d)(3)(i) (2010))).  The amici maintained that if a facility could itself constitute a 
program, every structure and facility would have to be made accessible at “enormous cost, 
regardless of whether programs were offered at those structures and facilities,” overturning 
“the entire regulatory framework for disabled access.” Id. at 3. 
 
 204. See id. at 1–2 (submitted on behalf of the National League of Cities and seventy-six 
California cities). 
 205. See Some Cities Changes [sic] Sides, Withdraw Support for Sacramento Appeal, 
RAGGED EDGE ONLINE, Jan. 11, 2003, http://ragged-edge-
mag.com/drn/sacramento110102.html [hereinafter Some Cities Change Sides] (reporting that 
“hundreds” of cities “offered to sign onto a friend-of-the-court brief supporting 
Sacramento”); see also Cities Join Sacramento to Take Sidewalk Access Fight to Supreme 
Court, RAGGED EDGE ONLINE, Nov. 25, 2002, http://ragged-edge-
mag.com/drn/sacramento110102.html (reporting that Sacramento claimed to “already ha[ve] 
the support of 75 cities, including Phoenix, Denver and New York City”).  However, several 
California cities that supported Sacramento at the appellate level, including San Anselmo, 
San Rafael, Corte Madera, Mill Valley, and San Diego, “change[d] sides” and decided not to 
support Sacramento in its appeal to the Supreme Court. See Some Cities Change Sides, supra 
(reporting the San Rafael city manager’s statement that the city withdrew its support for 
Sacramento upon learning the case “is being seen as a major civil rights struggle”); see also 
Dwight Daniels, City Reverses Course on Sidewalk Repairs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 
20, 2002, at B2 (discussing San Diego city attorney Casey Gwinn’s decision to “reverse 
course” after meeting with disability advocates, researching the law, and “doing some soul 
searching”). 
 206. See Cahill, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing National League of Cities’ attorney Greg 
F. Hurley’s statement that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “ignores the limitations on public 
entities” given the “phenomenally expensive task” of bringing thousands of miles of 
sidewalk into compliance with ADA accessibility regulations); see also Some Cities Change 
Sides, supra note 205 (providing Sacramento Public Works Director Mike Kashawagi’s 
comment that “[t]he financial implications for cities, counties, telecommunications and 
utility companies if [the Barden] decision is permitted to stand are enormous”). 
 207. See Daniels, supra note 205, at 1 (providing California League of Cities 
spokeswoman Megan Taylor’s explanation that the league’s support of Sacramento “has 
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Bringing sidewalks into compliance with ADA accessibility regulations 
is an expensive task, with the cost easily running into the millions.208  In 
1998, the Los Angeles City Council approved a ballot measure that would 
allot almost $770 million to repair damaged sidewalks over a twenty year 
period, $171.8 million of which would be designated for curb cuts and other 
ADA mandated improvements.209  Pasadena, California spent $9.7 million 
over a five year period to fix damaged sidewalks.210  The city of Little 
Rock, Arkansas, spent $2600 widening one stretch of sidewalk to allow 
wheelchair users room to maneuver around a single utility pole.211  As 
Lancaster City, Pennsylvania Mayor Rick Gray commented when faced 
with the $4 million cost of bringing Lancaster’s curb ramps into ADA 
compliance:  “Regulations are cheap.  Implementation is expensive.”212
City advocates point out that Congress outlined separate standards for 
new facilities and existing facilities in recognition of the prohibitive cost of 
requiring a city to update its entire public infrastructure at one time.
 
213  
They argue that imposing a program-access standard with regard to 
sidewalks that do not affect access to government programs hinders a public 
entity’s’ ability to realize the program accessibility envisioned by the 
ADA.214
 
nothing to do with cities being for or against the issues the disabled community is raising” 
but is a “question of resources”).  Taylor cautioned that California’s budget deficit of over 
$30 billion will further limit resources, and pointed out that cities still have to “make sure 
bridges don’t fall down and children go to school in public buildings where the toilets flush.” 
Id. 
  City advocates reason that it is more cost effective to concentrate 
 208. See, e.g., Andy Davis, LR Adding Wheelchair Curb Ramps Around City, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 2005, at 1B (discussing statement of the assistant director of 
public works that moving obstacles such as utility poles, traffic signals, and hydrants would 
“cost tens of thousands of dollars”); see also Erin Emery, Disabled See Barriers in Pueblo, 
DENVER POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at 1B (reporting that the city of Pueblo, Colorado has 
“millions of dollars of work to do” to comply with the ADA, and noting that it will cost “at 
least $20 million” to fix “curb cuts and ramps on sidewalks” and “problems in buildings”); 
Anne Belli Gesalman, Disabilities Act Spurs Changes, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 1995, 
at 37A (commenting that “[i]n addition to the $1 million already spent, the city of Dallas 
plans to spend at least another $750,000 over the next several years on ADA improvement”). 
 209. Sue McAllister, A Deeply Rooted Problem, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at B2. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See Andy Davis, Sidewalk Where Pole Posed Issue Is Widened, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Mar. 3, 2005, at 1B. 
 212. Bernard Harris, How Many Ramps Must Be Redone?, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Feb. 
22, 2007, at A1; see also George Merritt, Still Battling Barriers:  Costs, Intricate Rules 
Make Goal of 1990 Disabilities Law Elusive, DENVER POST, Feb. 1, 2004, at 1B (providing 
Pueblo City Manager Lee Evett’s comment regarding the $20 million worth of curb 
modifications needed in Pueblo:  “we want to comply, but who can pay for that? . . . The 
feds don’t want to pay for it, the state doesn’t want to pay for it, we can’t pay for it—even 
the Justice Department doesn’t know what to do”). 
    213.  See Brief for the National League of Cities, supra note 203, at 3. 
 214. See id. (arguing that Congress “sought to balance the societal interest in greater 
disabled access with the need to ensure the efficient use of limited public resources”); see 
also Brief for Texas Municipal League and International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amici 
Curiae in Support of the Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 4, Frame v. City of 
Arlington, 575 F.3d 432 (5th. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 08-10630, 08-10631), 2009 WL 6706544 at 
*4 [hereinafter Brief for Texas Municipal League] (arguing that Congress enacted 
regulations requiring “immediate access to programs but more gradual, incremental 
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limited funds on facilities where the accessibility of government services, 
programs, and activities is a problem.215
2.  Frame v. City of Arlington:  Title II Coverage of Public Sidewalks 
Contingent on Whether Noncompliance Hinders Access to “Actual” 
Services 
 
In August of 2010, the Fifth Circuit adopted a narrow interpretation in 
Frame v. City of Arlington that public sidewalks are not, in themselves 
“services, programs, or activities,” and therefore, plaintiffs have a private 
cause of action to enforce the Title II regulations only to the extent that 
noncompliant sidewalks prevent access to “actual” government services, 
programs, or activities.216
In 2008, two disabled residents sued the city of Arlington under Title II 
and section 504, citing over one hundred inaccessible curbs and 
sidewalks.
  This section will begin by detailing the court’s 
determination that the statutory text, though ambiguous, supports a narrow 
construction of Title II.  Second, this section discusses the court’s 
conclusion that the language and structure of the Title II regulations 
unambiguously indicates that sidewalks constitute facilities as distinct from 
the services to which they provide access. 
217  The plaintiffs requested an injunction requiring the city of 
Arlington to bring any non-accessible curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots 
into compliance with ADA regulations.218
In its original opinion in Frame v. City of Arlington,
 
219 the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots are considered “services, 
programs, or activities” within the meaning of Title II.220  Both parties 
disagreed with the court’s rulings, and the panel granted a petition for 
rehearing.221
 
implementation of access to facilities” in an effort to balance the desire to achieve 
accessibility with the “tremendous financial costs” on public entities). 
  After rehearing the case, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its earlier 
 215. See Brief of the National League of Cities, supra note 203, at 16. 
 216. Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc 
granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011). 
 217. Id.  Both plaintiffs had mobility impairments that necessitated the use of motorized 
wheelchairs. Id.  The plaintiffs complained of “missing or badly sloped curb ramps; 
impassable, noncontinuous or nonexistent sidewalks; and inadequate handicap parking.” Op-
Ed., Under ADA, Is a Sidewalk an Essential Service or an Amenity?, STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 
24, 2010, http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/08/24/2422898/under-ada-is-a-sidewalk-an-
essential.html. 
 218. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 481. 
 219. 575 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2009), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 616 F.3d 476 
(5th Cir. 2010). 
 220. Frame, 575 F.3d at 436–37.  The Fifth Circuit also held that plaintiffs’ Title II 
claims accrued on the date the city completed the noncompliant construction or alterations, 
not when individual plaintiffs actually encountered such noncompliant barriers. Id. at 441. 
 221. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 479.  Plaintiffs challenged the court’s decision on the statute 
of limitations issue. See id. at 479 n.1.  The city of Arlington contested the court’s 
conclusion that sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots constitute “services, programs, or 
activities” within the meaning of Title II, and the Texas Municipal League and the 
International Lawyers Association filed an amicus brief in support of the City’s petition for 
rehearing. See Brief for Texas Municipal League, supra note 214. 
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opinion and held that public sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots cannot, in 
themselves, be considered “services, programs, or activities” within the 
meaning of the ADA.222  The court concluded that sidewalks, curbs, and 
parking lots are “facilities” and therefore plaintiffs did not have a private 
cause of action to enforce the Title II regulations unless the noncompliant 
sidewalks prevent access to an actual service, program, or activity.223
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that other circuits had broadly 
interpreted the language of Title II to encompass public sidewalks, but 
maintained that the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits failed to 
conduct a “thorough analysis” of the issue.
 
224  The court concluded that it 
was “certain” that “services, programs, or activities” could not include 
“anything a public entity does” as the Ninth Circuit had previously held in 
Barden.225
Turning first to the statutory text, the Fifth Circuit noted that Title II does 
not define the phrase “services, programs, or activities,” but found the 
statutory definition of “‘qualified individual with a disability’” 
instructive.
 
226  Section 12131(2) defines a “‘qualified individual with a 
disability’” as a person who “‘with or without . . . the removal of . . . 
transportation barriers . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for 
the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided 
by a public entity.’”227  The court reasoned that this definition indicated 
Congress’s intent to differentiate between physical infrastructures and the 
“‘services’ to which they provide access.”228
The court explained that a narrow reading of the statute was also 
supported by the “ordinary, ‘everyday meaning’” of the term “service.”
 
229  
The court cited a dictionary defining a “service” as “‘the duties, work, or 
business performed or discharged by a government official’” and “‘the 
provision, organization, or apparatus for . . . meeting a general demand.’”230
 
 222. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 479–80 & n.1; see also Under ADA, Is a Sidewalk an 
Essential Service or an Amenity?, supra note 
  
217 (reporting that the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
to “reverse[] itself and on a 2-1 vote offer[] a narrow interpretation of the ADA’s 
requirements”). 
 223. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 488; see also Greer v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 
3:08-CV-160-M, 2010 WL 4607393, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2010) (relying on Frame in 
concluding that plaintiff could not prove a claim for injunctive relief under Title II based on 
noncompliant parking spaces and a noncompliant ramp at a school football stadium because 
she failed to prove she was denied access to the services at the field). 
 224. Frame, 616 F.3d at 485 n.10. 
 225. Id. at 485.  The dissent argued that the majority cited no case law in support of this 
narrow interpretation. See id. at 494 (Prado, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 226. Id. at 485–86 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1231(2), 12312 (2006)). 
 227. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)); see supra note 94. 
 228. Frame, 616 F.3d at 486. 
 229. Id. (citing United States v. Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d 466, 476 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
 230. Id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2075 
(1993)).  In its original opinion the Fifth Circuit consulted a different dictionary, which 
defined a “service” as “a facility supplying some public demand.” See Frame v. City of 
Arlington, 575 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 1137 (11th ed. 2003)), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 616 F.3d 476 
(5th Cir. 2010).  Upon rehearing, the dissent argued that sidewalks constitute a public service 
under either definition because a public entity, in providing and maintaining sidewalks, 
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The court reasoned that while a public entity arguably provides an 
“apparatus” by building and maintaining public sidewalks, the 
infrastructure itself does not constitute a service.231
The Fifth Circuit noted that this analysis of the statutory text supports the 
conclusion that sidewalks constitute infrastructure, as distinct from the 
services to which they provide access.
 
232  However, the court 
acknowledged that the term “services” could be interpreted more broadly, 
as Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit precedent has indicated, and 
ultimately concluded that the statute was ambiguous.233
The Fifth Circuit therefore looked to the regulations promulgated by the 
DOJ.
 
234  The court determined that the language and structure of the 
regulations, taken together, “clearly indicate[d]” that sidewalks, curbs, and 
parking lots do not constitute “services, programs, or activities” within the 
meaning of the ADA.235  The Fifth Circuit claimed that the fact that the 
section 35.104 definition of “facilities” includes sidewalks, curbs, and 
parking lots “strongly suggests” they do not qualify as “services, programs, 
or activities.”236  The court found additional support in section 35.149, 
which prohibits a public entity from excluding disabled individuals from 
“services, programs, or activities” because of the inaccessibility of its 
facilities.237  The court argued that reading facilities as a subset of services 
would render section 35.149 redundant, prohibiting inaccessible services 
that exclude the disabled from “services.”238  Thus, the court reasoned, 
facilities and services must be considered “mutually exclusive” 
categories.239
Finally, the court took note of the “unique framework of regulatory 
requirements” established for facilities, which outlines different 
accessibility requirements for new facilities, as opposed to alterations of 
existing facilities.
 
240  The court argued that subjecting facilities to the same 
regulatory requirements as services would render the facilities regulations 
“superfluous.”241
 
“performs the ‘work’ traditionally undertaken by a municipality.” Frame, 616 F.3d at 491 
(Prado, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
  The court explained that if facilities were considered 
services, they would be subject to the “immediate compliance” requirement 
 231. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 486 (majority opinion). 
 232. See id. 
 233. See id. (“[W]e cannot conclude that the statutory language unambiguously excludes 
cities’ and states’ physical infrastructure as distinct from the panoply of less tangible benefits 
cities and states offer to their residents . . . .”). 
 234. See id. at 486–87 (discussing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.130, 35.149–59 (2010)); see 
supra Part I.E.2. 
 235. Frame, 616 F.3d at 488 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.149–51). 
 236. Id. at 487 (noting that sidewalks, parking lots, and curbs are “clustered” with items, 
such as equipment, that “clearly do not qualify as ‘services, programs, or activities’”); see 28 
C.F.R. § 35.104. 
 237. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 487 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.149). 
 238. See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.149). 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id. (arguing that if facilities qualified as “‘services, programs, or activities,’ they 
would be subject to the regulatory language in § 35.149”). 
 241. Id. at 487–88 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149–51). 
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of § 35.149, negating the “general accessibility” requirements of the 
facilities regulations, which provide for a “phasing-in of compliant 
facilities.”242
In light of the language and structure of the ADA regulations, the court 
found that the regulations “clearly indicate[d]” that sidewalks, curbs, and 
parking lots are “facilities” that do not qualify as “services, programs, or 
activities” under Title II.
 
243  Because the court found that the Title II 
regulations unambiguously indicated Congress’s intent to distinguish 
between “services” and “facilities” and to deem sidewalks facilities, it did 
not address the DOJ’s interpretation of the regulations.244  The Fifth Circuit 
held that plaintiffs have no cause of action to “enforce the regulatory 
requirements” with respect to those facilities unless they prevent access to 
some actual service, program, or activity.245
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Frame was not unanimous, and Judge 
Edward C. Prado wrote a vigorous dissent on the issue of whether 
sidewalks constitute a “service” within the meaning of Title II.
 
246  Judge 
Prado argued that the issue is not whether sidewalks are themselves a 
service, but whether a city provides a service through the construction, 
maintenance, or alteration of those sidewalks.247
Judge Prado found that the majority’s holding was contrary to 
congressional intent.
 
248  He contended that the plain language of the statute 
“unambiguous[ly]” provides that the phrase “services, programs, and 
activities” should be interpreted broadly, and argued that sidewalks, parking 
lots, and curbs clearly qualify as a “service” within the ordinary meaning of 
the word.249
Judge Prado noted that even if the statute could be considered 
ambiguous, the plain language of the relevant regulations “demonstrates 
that providing sidewalks is a public service,” as does the legislative history 
 
 
 242. Id. (discussing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149–51); see supra notes 100–04 and accompanying 
text. 
 243. Id. at 488. 
 244. Id. at 480, 483 (upon finding the statutory text ambiguous, looking first to the 
implementing regulation and only deferring to the agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations if “the regulations are ‘ambigu[ous] with respect to the specific question 
considered’”) (quoting Moore v. Hannon Food Serv., 317 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
 245. Id. at 488, 490.  The court provided that district courts should not apply any “set 
proximity limitation of the sidewalk to the benefit” in determining whether an individual has 
effectively been denied the benefit of a public service due to the inaccessibility of a 
sidewalk. Id. at 484 & n.9. 
 246. See id. at 490–96 (Prado, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 247. See id. at 490 (“I fear that the majority departs dramatically from congressional 
intent and creates a distinction that is unworkable and ultimately meaningless.”). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 491–92 (interpreting the language of Title II as “providing broad coverage” 
and arguing that “[a] statute is not ambiguous simply because it offers expansive coverage”).  
Judge Prado commented that other circuits have “consistently held” that the phrase 
“services, programs, or activities” provides broad coverage under Title II. Id. at 491. 
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of Title II.250  In Judge Prado’s view, though the regulations distinguish 
between facilities and services, the provision of those facilities still 
constitutes a service.251
Finally, Judge Prado deemed the majority’s standard “unworkable,” 
given the difficulty in determining which sidewalks qualify as Title II 
services and which do not.
 
252  Judge Prado reasoned that without any 
proximity limitation, only “sidewalks to nowhere” would not meet the 
majority’s standard, and questioned whether any sidewalk truly “goes 
nowhere.”253
III.  PUBLIC SIDEWALKS ARE COVERED “SERVICES, PROGRAMS, OR 
ACTIVITIES” UNDER TITLE II OF THE ADA 
 
Part II of this Note detailed the circuit split regarding the reach of Title 
II’s nondiscrimination mandate, specifically whether the phrase “services, 
programs, or activities” encompasses public sidewalks.254  The Ninth 
Circuit has endorsed a broad reading of Title II and held that public 
sidewalks are a “service, program, or activity” within the meaning of the 
statute.  The Fifth Circuit has read Title II more narrowly, and held that 
public sidewalks are facilities that do not qualify as “programs, services, or 
activities.”  Title II was passed as part of the ADA, a civil rights statute that 
represents the culmination of the disability rights movement.255  Enacted to 
facilitate the “integrated participation of people with disabilities in all 
aspects of community life,”256 Title II provides that public entities shall not 
exclude disabled persons from, or deny them the benefits of, government 
“services, programs, or activities.”257
 
 250. Id. at 492–94 (pointing out that “[c]urb ramps and sidewalks are specifically 
mentioned in 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(e)(2)” and arguing that “[i]t would be contrary to the 
purpose of the ADA for a public entity to erect non-compliant sidewalks”). 
  Part III of this Note argues that the 
 251. See id. at 493 (“Although the regulations may set apart facilities from services, 
nothing in the regulations suggests that when a public entity provides those facilities, it does 
not provide a service.”). 
 252. Id. at 494. 
 253. Id. at 495.  Following the Fifth Circuit’s August 23, 2010 ruling in Frame, the 
plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc on September 7, 2010, and the DOJ filed an 
amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs’ position. Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Frame, 616 F.3d 476 (No. 
08-10630), 2010 WL 5306469.  In its brief, the DOJ argued, in line with Barden and the 
Fifth Circuit’s first opinion in Frame, that the provision and maintenance of public services 
constitute “services, programs, or activities” within the meaning of Title II, and agreed with 
Judge Prado that the Fifth Circuit’s distinction between public sidewalks that lead to public 
functions that are programs, services, or activities, and those that do not is “unworkable in 
practice.” Id. at 14–15.  The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for rehearing en banc on 
January 26, 2010. Frame v. City of Arlington, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1 (5th 
Cir. Jan. 26, 2011). 
 254. See supra Part II. 
 255. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 256. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), at 49–50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
472–73 (noting that integrated public services are “essential” to achieving the goals of Title 
II and eliminating the “invisibility of the handicapped”); see supra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
 257. See supra Part I.E.1. 
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statutory text, legislative history, implementing regulations, and agency 
interpretation of those implementing regulations support the Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusion that public sidewalks constitute a “service, program, or activity” 
of a public entity within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act. 
First, this part argues that the plain language of Title II unambiguously 
indicates that public sidewalks are a covered “service, program, or 
activity”—a conclusion further supported by the legislative history of Title 
II.  Then, this part posits that even supposing Title II could be considered 
ambiguous, the plain language of the Title II regulations evidences the 
DOJ’s clear view that public sidewalks are a “service, program, or activity” 
within the meaning of Title II—an interpretation entitled to substantial 
deference under Chevron. 
Next, this part contends that even if the Title II regulations were unclear, 
the DOJ’s position that public sidewalks are subject to the accessibility 
requirements of the Title II regulations is entitled to deference under Auer.  
Finally, this part reasons that applying the nondiscrimination provision of 
Title II to sidewalks would not require cities to immediately replace their 
entire sidewalk system, and that the undue burden provision in the Title II 
regulations protects cities from excessive expenses associated with bringing 
sidewalks into compliance with the ADA. 
A.  The Provision, Construction, and Maintenance of a Public Sidewalk 
System Is a “Service,” Program, or Activity” Within the Meaning of Title II 
Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall . . . 
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity.”258  In interpreting Title II, 
Chevron requires that a court first look to the statutory language and 
determine whether Congress clearly intended sidewalks to fall within Title 
II’s purview.259  This section argues that using the “traditional tools of 
statutory construction,” an analysis of Title II makes it clear that the phrase 
“services, programs, or activities” is broad enough to include the provision 
and maintenance of a system of public sidewalks.260
Though Title II does not define the term “services, programs, or 
activities,” section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act defines the statutory phrase 





 258. See supra note 
  Because Title II was modeled on section 504, and the ADA 
explicitly provides that the provisions of the ADA should not be “construed 
to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of the 
92 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra Part I.G. 
 260. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 42, 89–90 and accompanying text.  Similarly, the legislative history 
of Title II indicates that Title II was meant to extend the provisions of section 504 to “all 
actions of state and local governments.” See supra note 178. 
2294 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
Rehabilitation Act,” the statutory text of Title II should be interpreted as 
broadly as the section 504 definition of “programs or activities.”262
The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that the 
phrase “services, programs, or activities” is purposefully expansive.
 
263  The 
ordinary meaning of the word “service” is necessarily broad, as evidenced 
by the multiple expansive definitions of the term.264  When a local 
government provides a public sidewalk system, it performs the “work” of a 
public official by providing a “facility supplying [a] public demand” and an 
“apparatus . . . meeting a general demand.”265  Thus, as the Ninth Circuit 
concluded in Barden, the provision of a public sidewalk system can 
reasonably be understood to constitute a “service” under Title II.266
Importantly, the canons of statutory construction also provide that a word 
should not be interpreted in isolation, but in light of the structure and 
purpose of the statute.
 
267  The structure of Title II supports a broad reading 
of the term “services.”  While Congress provided detailed, explicit 
definitions for some Title II’s terms—including “public entity,” “qualified 
individual with a disability,” and “facility”—it did not place any such 
constraints on the reading of the phrase “services, programs, or 
activities.”268  Furthermore, the term “service” is grouped with the similarly 
general words “activity” and “program.”269
A broad reading of Title II is further supported by the ADA’s legislative 
history.  Congress’s stated purpose in passing the ADA was “[t]o provide a 
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
 
270  Moreover, 
Congress enacted the ADAAA with the express purpose of counteracting 
the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of certain ADA terms, and 
reiterating its intent to provide expansive coverage for individuals with 
disabilities under the ADA.271
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Title II was enacted against a 





 262. See supra note 
  The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA 
89; see also supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra Part I.E.3; see also supra notes 170–75 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.  When not expressly defined in the 
statute, statutory terms are given their “ordinary meaning.” See supra Part I.G. 
 265. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra Part I.G. 
 268. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 269. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 190, at 7 n.2 (noting 
that the dictionary definitions of the terms “program,” “activity,” and “service” “confirm 
their breadth”).  The dictionary definition of “activity” is “a natural or normal function.” 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 22 (1986).  “Program” is defined as “a 
schedule or system under which action may be taken towards a desired goal.” Id. at 1812. 
 270. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra Part I.F. 
 272. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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reveals that Congress specifically recognized architectural barriers as a 
pervasive form of discrimination against the handicapped.273
Critically, legislative history of the ADA also indicates that Congress 
specifically recognized the importance of accessible streets and walkways 
in accomplishing the integrative goals of the ADA.  In the House Report 
accompanying the ADA, Congress expressly stated that public entities must 
provide curb cuts, and noted that the “employment, transportation, and 
public accommodation sections of [the ADA] would be meaningless if 
people who use wheelchairs were not afforded the opportunity to travel on 
and between the streets.”
 
274
The Rehabilitation Act definition of “programs and services” and a plain 
reading of language of Title II support the conclusion that the statutory 
phrase “services, programs, and activities” is unambiguously broad.
 
275  In 
light of the statutory text and the legislative history of Title II, it is clear that 
Congress intended to provide for expansive coverage under Title II of the 
ADA, and that sidewalks fall within the scope of Title II.276
B.  Public Sidewalks Constitute a Public Service Within the Meaning of the 
Title II Regulations 
 
As Part III.A argued, the statutory text of Title II is unambiguously 
broad, and covers all activities of state and local governments, including the 
provision and maintenance of a public sidewalk system.  Because Title II 
clearly encompasses the provision of public sidewalks, it is unnecessary to 
consider the DOJ’s implementing regulations.277  As the Supreme Court 
outlined in Chevron, once a court concludes that Congress has directly 
addressed a specific issue, the court “must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”278
Nevertheless, this section argues that even if the text of Title II were 
considered ambiguous, the DOJ regulations plainly demonstrate that 
sidewalks qualify as a public service within the meaning of Title II.
 
279  So 
long as the DOJ regulations are unambiguous and “based on a permissible 
construction of the statute,” they are entitled to deference under Chevron.280
The Title II regulations promulgated by the DOJ provide that “no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, because a public entity’s 
facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be 
excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the services, 
 
 
 273. See supra notes 60, 71 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra note 108. 
 275. See Part II.A; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 253, at 3, 5 (“By its plain terms, the 
statute covers the sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots at issue in this case.”). 
 276. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra Part I.G; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 278. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); 
see also supra Part I.G. 
 279. See infra notes 280–93 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
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programs, or activities of a public entity.”281  While it is true, as the Fifth 
Circuit recognizes, that the regulations differentiate between “services” and 
“facilities,” it does not follow that the provision of certain facilities cannot 
constitute a service.282  Sidewalks, as infrastructure, constitute facilities.283  
The DOJ regulations expressly define “facilities” to include “walks” and 
“passageways,” as the Fifth Circuit noted in Frame.284  However, while the 
sidewalks themselves may be facilities, the provision and maintenance of a 
public sidewalk system is a government service.285
Additionally, Title II and the DOJ’s implementing regulations not only 
proscribe the exclusion of disabled individuals from government 
“programs, services, or activities,” but also prohibit public entities from 
denying disabled persons the benefit of those government functions.
 
286
Furthermore, the Title II regulations specifically contemplate Title II’s 
application to public sidewalks.
  In 
supplying a system of sidewalks, a government entity performs a service, 
the benefit of which is the ability to use city walkways to freely move about 
a city.  If sidewalks are inaccessible to, and unusable by, disabled persons, 
those individuals are both “exclude[d] from participation in” the city’s 
system of public walkways and “den[ied] the benefit of” a government 
service. 
287  Though the regulations do not expressly 
state that sidewalks must be made accessible, section 35.151(e) provides 
that all newly constructed or altered roads and walkways must contain curb 
ramps.288  This requirement, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in Barden, 
“reveals a general concern for the accessibility of public sidewalks.”289  
Moreover, because curb ramps “could not be covered [under the ADA] 
unless the sidewalks themselves are covered,” the curb ramp requirement 
serves as an acknowledgment that public sidewalks are covered under Title 
II.290
Under the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the Title II regulations, public 
entities would only be obligated to modify sidewalks to the extent necessary 





 281. See supra note 
  This interpretation overlooks the language of section 
98 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 244, 251 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra note 251 and accompanying text; see also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, supra note 190, at 8 (noting that “in other contexts, [the Supreme] Court 
itself has recognized the provision of sidewalks as an archetypal ‘general government 
service[]’” (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947) (noting that 
providing churches access to “such general government services as ordinary police and fire 
protection, connections for sewage disposal, [and] public highways and sidewalks” does not 
pose a problem under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment))). 
 286. See supra Part I.E.1–2. 
 287. See supra Part II.A. 
 288. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. 
 289. See Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 
supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 290. See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077; see also supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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35.150(d)(2), which contemplates the accessibility of all public sidewalks, 
not just those immediately adjacent to other government facilities.  Though 
section 35.150(d)(2), which requires public entities to implement transition 
plans, prioritizes the installation of curb ramps in “walkways serving 
entities covered by the Act, including State and local government offices 
and facilities,” the regulation also requires that transition plans schedule 
curb cuts for walkways serving “transportation, places of public 
accommodation, and employers” as well as “walkways serving other 
areas.”292
The plain language of the DOJ regulations evidences the DOJ’s position 
that public sidewalks are subject to the provisions of Title II.  Because the 
DOJ promulgated the Title II regulations pursuant to authority delegated to 
it by Congress, the DOJ’s interpretation of Title II contained in those 
regulations is entitled to Chevron deference.
 
293
C.  The Department of Justice Considers Sidewalks Subject to the 
Accessibility Requirements of the Title II Regulations 
 
Part III.B argues that even if the language of Title II were deemed 
ambiguous, the conclusion that public sidewalks fall within the scope of 
Title II is still warranted because the Title II regulations unambiguously 
reflect the DOJ’s position that public sidewalks are covered by Title II—
earning deference under Chevron.  Consequently, it is unnecessary to turn 
to the DOJ’s interpretation of the Title II regulations it promulgates.294
In the amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court in Barden, the 
Solicitor General outlined the DOJ’s position that public sidewalks fall 
within the scope of Title II and the DOJ regulations.  The Solicitor General 
identified the Title II regulations as being “premised on the view that a 
public sidewalk system is a covered service, program, or activity under 
Title II.”
  
However, in the event the Title II regulations are considered ambiguous, 
this Note argues that a broad interpretation of Title II is still proper because 
the DOJ has taken the stance that public sidewalks are subject to the 
accessibility requirements of the Title II regulations, and an agency’s 
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is afforded deference under 
Auer. 
295  The DOJ reaffirmed this position in its amicus brief in support 
of the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing en banc in Frame.296
 
 292. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d)(2) (2010 and Mar. 15, 2011 amendments); Barden, 292 F.3d 
at 1077. 
  That 
interpretation cannot be said to be “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
 293. See supra Part I.G; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 253, at 6 (arguing that the DOJ’s 
position that “maintenance of pedestrian walkways by public entities is a covered program” 
under Title II is “entitled to substantial deference”). 
 294. See supra Part I.G. 
 295. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 190, at 6, 10–12. 
 296. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants’ Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc, supra note 253, at 6. 
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the regulation[s]” themselves, and therefore, as the Ninth Circuit concluded, 
the DOJ’s interpretation is entitled to substantial deference under Auer.297
D.  Title II and its Implementing Regulations Do Not Require Cities To 
Make Every Existing Sidewalk Accessible 
 
Finally, it is worth noting the weakness of arguments suggesting that 
subjecting public sidewalks to the accessibility requirements of Title II 
would pose excessive financial and administrative burdens on cities.  This 
section asserts that the Title II regulations protect cities from unreasonable 
costs by providing that public entities are not “necessarily require[d]” to 
make every existing facility accessible, and are not required to take any 
steps that would result “in undue financial and administrative burdens.”298
A public entity does not have to make its entire existing sidewalk system 
immediately accessible to the disabled to comply with Title II.  While the 
regulations require that all newly constructed or altered sidewalks are 
readily accessible, existing sidewalks, like other existing facilities, are 
subject to the more limited program access standard.
 
299  Under the Title II 
regulations, a public entity is not obligated to renovate every existing 
stretch of sidewalk, but is only required to replace existing sidewalks to the 
extent necessary to ensure that the public sidewalk system, when viewed in 
its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with 
disabilities.300
Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA reveals that Congress 
acknowledged the potential financial constraints on cities, and the Title II 
regulations expressly state that a city’s obligation to make existing facilities 
accessible is subject to an undue burden defense.
 
301  A public entity is not 
required to renovate its sidewalks if it can show that bringing its public 
sidewalk system into compliance with Title II’s accessibility requirements 
would result in “undue administrative or financial burdens.”302
Granted, “undue burden” is a demanding standard, and even minor fixes, 
such as removing obstacles in sidewalks, will impose some cost on 
cities.
 
303  However, as Congress noted in the House Report on the ADA, 
the long-term societal benefits of the integration of people with disabilities 
are worth the short-term financial and administrative burdens.304
CONCLUSION 
 
The ADA was enacted against a history of state discrimination in the 
administration of public services.  Many viewed the passage of the ADA as 
a major civil rights victory, and a significant step towards the full 
 
 297. See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077; see also supra Part II.A. 
 298. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra Part I.E.2. 
 301. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra Part I.E.2. 
 303. See supra notes 104, 208–12 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra note 104. 
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participation of disabled individuals in society.  However, since the ADA’s 
enactment, courts have struggled to discern exactly how far Congress 
intended the protections of the ADA to reach. 
One such source of contention has been the scope of Title II, and what 
government functions fall within Title II’s nondiscrimination mandate.  The 
Ninth Circuit has endorsed a broad interpretation of the statutory text, 
holding that public sidewalks constitute “programs, services, or activities” 
within the meaning of Title II.  The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, has interpreted 
the statute more narrowly and determined that public sidewalks are not in 
themselves “services” within the meaning Title II. 
The statutory language, legislative history, implementing regulations, and 
DOJ interpretation of Title II demonstrate that public sidewalks are in fact 
subject to the accessibility requirements of Title II.  The Fifth Circuit’s 
holding in Frame would allow public entities to deny individuals with 
disabilities access to public sidewalks that do not lead to some other 
government service.  Such a narrow interpretation of Title II contravenes 
Congress’s stated goals of integration and participation.  As Jacobus 
tenBroek recognized at the beginning of the disability rights movement, 
“[t]he right to live in the world,” includes the right to move within it.305  




 305. tenBroek, supra note 25, at 918. 
 306. Id. 
